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Abstract—Revenue sharing contracts between Content
Providers (CPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can act
as leverage for enhancing the infrastructure of the Internet.
ISPs can be incentivised to make investments in network
infrastructure that improve Quality of Service (QoS) for users
if attractive contracts are negotiated between them and CPs.
The idea here is that part of the net profit gained by CPs
are given to ISPs to invest in the network. The Moral Hazard
economic framework is used to model such an interaction, in
which a principal determines a contract, and an agent reacts
by adapting her effort. In our setting, several competitive CPs
interact through one common ISP. Two cases are studied: (i) the
ISP differentiates between the CPs and makes a (potentially)
different investment to improve the QoS of each CP, and (ii) the
ISP does not differentiate between CPs and makes a common
investment for both. The last scenario can be viewed as network
neutral behavior on the part of the ISP. We analyse the optimal
contracts and show that the CP that can better monetize its
demand always prefers the non-neutral regime. Interestingly,
ISP revenue, as well as social utility, are also found to be higher
under the non-neutral regime.
Index Terms—revenue sharing, net neutrality, moral hazard
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of data-intensive services has resulted in
an explosion of the Internet traffic, and it is expected to in-
crease at an even faster rate in the future [1]. To accommodate
this increase in traffic, and to provide better Quality of Service
(QoS) for end users, Internet service providers (ISPs) need
to upgrade their network infrastructure and expand capacity.
This development follows the deployment of next generation
networks that will induce more business interactions between
service providers and content providers. For example, caching
technologies has recently received increased attention from
industry and academia to be a key solution for next generation
networks [2]. As it is specified in this special issue, the
economics of caching will be one of important aspect in
deciding the monetary interactions between the ISPs and CPs.
In terms of return on investments, the ISPs, especially the
ones providing last-mile connectivity, feel that the revenue
from end-users (mainly access charges) are often not enough
to recoup their investment costs and they propose that the CPs
share the risk by sharing part of their revenues. The CPs may
also have the incentive to contribute to ISP capacity expansion,
as increased capacity and better QoS trigger higher demand
for content and help them earn even higher revenues (mainly
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from subscriptions and advertisements) [3]. For example, in
[4], the authors propose a model in which a Mobile Network
Operator leases its edge caches to a Content Provider. This
is an increasingly relevant scenario and follows proposals
for deploying edge storage resources at mobile 5G networks
[5]. A recent announcement by Comcast that it will bundle
Netflix subscription in its package is another example of an
ISP helping a CP to increase its demand.
If a CP enters into a contract with an ISP to share its revenue
in return for ISP putting efforts to improve demand for its
content, the CP may want to monitor the efforts level of ISP
so that the contract is honored. However such monitoring of
efforts levels may not be always feasible in the Internet as there
is an inherent asymmetry of information between CPs and ISPs
– CPs cannot observe the exact investment (caching effort)
made by the ISP, but can only observe the resulting increase
in user demand for its content, which is a (random) function
of the ISP’s investment. In this situation, an obvious question
arises: how can this imperfect information about the ISP’s
investment be used to formulate an optimal revenue sharing
contract? This is a situation where a privately taken action
(investment) by the ISP influences the probability distribution
of the outcome (demand) for the CP.
The role of this information asymmetry between the CP
and ISP is critical under such agreements, where ISP makes
an investment which ultimately benefits the CP, and should be
considered in the structure of the contract. Therefore, moral
hazard can be applied to propose a contract in which the ISP
(agent) knows that CP (principle) will pay to cover its risks,
which in turn gives the ISP the incentive to make the (risky)
investment. Also, the moral hazard model is proven to induce
proper incentives for taking appropriate action [6], and this
may provide fair revenue sharing between CPs and ISPs. In
our work, we propose an incentivizing mechanism using the
moral hazard approach in which CPs share a part of their
revenues with an ISP expecting a better QoS for their content
and higher revenue in return from the ISP efforts.
The classical moral hazard problem deals with a single
principle and a single agent, whereas we are faced with
possibility of multiple principles interacting with multiple
agents. In this work, we focus on a monopolistic ISP con-
necting end users to multiple CPs, i.e., multiple principles
and a single agent. Our interest is in determining optimal
sharing mechanisms/contracts between each CP and the ISP.
We distinguish two cases for the effort (investment) made
by the ISP. In one case, we allow the ISP to make different
amounts of effort for each CP, and in the other case, the ISP
is constrained to put an equal amount of effort for all CPs.
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2The former case corresponds to a ‘non-neutral’ regime where
the ISP is allowed to differentiate between CPs, and the latter
case corresponds to a ‘neutral’ regime where the ISP cannot
differentiate between CPs. We compare the revenue of each
players and social utilities under both the regimes and analyze
which regime is preferred by the players.
We consider competition between multiple CPs that provide
content of a particular type, for example, video, and aim to
earn higher revenue by entering into a revenue sharing contract
with the ISP. Each CP separately negotiates with the ISP know-
ing that the other CPs can also enter into similar negotiations
with the ISP. We consider linear contracts and analyze the
equilibrium sharing contracts in both the neutral and non-
neutral regime. We first consider the symmetric case where all
the CPs earn same revenue per unit demand. This corresponds
to the case where ability of the CPs to monitize their demand
is the same. We then study the asymetric case where the CPs
capability to monetize their demand could be different. Our
contributions and observations can be summarized as follows:
• We model the competitive revenue sharing of CPs with
an ISP in return for improved QoS in the moral hazard
framework with multiple principles and a single agent.
• We analyze the equilibrium contracts in a regime where
the ISP can put a different level of effort for each CP
(non-neutral) and in a regime where it is constrained to
put equal efforts for all CPs (neutral).
• In the symmetric case we show that all the players prefer
the non-neutral regimes as their utilities are higher
• In the asymmetric case we show that the CP which can
better monetize the demand for its traffic always prefers
the non-neutral regime whereas the CP with weaker
monetization power can prefer the neutral or non-neutral
regime depending on its relative monetization power.
• The ISP always prefers the non-neutral regime. Moreover,
social utility (defined as the sum of the average earning
of all players) is also higher in the non-neutral regime.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we discuss
the problem setup and define contracts under the neutral
and non-neutral regime. We study the equilibrium contracts
under neutral and non-neutral regime under the symmetric
case in in Section III and under asymetric case in Section IV.
Conclusions and future extensions are discussed in Section V.
Proofs of all stated results can be found in the appendix.
A. Related works
Several works [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] study the possibility of
content charges by ISPs to recover investment costs. In [7] and
[8], the authors investigated the feasibility of ISPs charging a
content charge to CPs, and evaluate its effect by modeling the
Stackelberg game between CPs and ISPs. In [9] and [10], a
revenue-sharing scheme is proposed when the ISP provides a
content piracy monitoring service to CPs for increasing the
demand for their content. This work is extended to two ISPs
competing with each other in [11] where only one of them
provides the content piracy monitoring service. Several studies
considered cooperative settlement between service providers
for profit sharing [12], [13], [14] where the mechanisms are
derived using the Shapely value concept.
A moral hazard framework is applied in [15] to study
interconnection contracts between ISP and end users in the
market for network transport services. However, the contract
design problem between ISPs and CPs remained unaddressed
in this work. In the present paper, we apply the moral
hazard approach to study revenue sharing between an ISP
and multiple CPs. The CPs act as the principles that enter
into a contract with the ISP (agent) to improve QoS for their
content. We thus end up with a multiple principle, single agent
problem.
A moral hazard framework where two principals offer a
contract to the same agent is studied in [16] where the
principals can only observe correlated noisy signals of the
common one-dimensional action taken by the agent, where
the principals’ output is linearly increasing with the agent’s
action. Our work is different from them as we consider that
even though the agent (ISP) is common, it chooses different
actions for each principal (CP). We also compare it with the
setting when the ISP is forced to choose the same action
for both CPs. Also, we consider the demands of CPs to be
logarithmic in the efforts of the agent, unlike the linear case
considered in [16]. Such a demand function comes from the
fact that the delay experienced by end users is exponential in
the cache and not linear as assumed in [14] and [17].
A moral hazard setup is also used in [18] for motivating end
users to participate in crowd-sourced services in one principal
and several agent problem.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider multiple Content Providers (CPs) and a single
Internet Service Provider (ISP) that connects end users to the
content of the CPs. Each CP can enter into a contract with
the ISP under which the ISP agrees to offer a better quality of
service on the contents of the CPs to the end users by investing
in the network infrastructure [19] and in turn, each CP agrees
to share a part of its revenue with the ISP. One example of ISP
investing in network infrastructure to improve QoS is caching,
where better caching efforts by the ISP for a CP’s content
results in higher revenue for the CP. However, such caching
decisions (effort or action) of ISP may not be directly visible
to the CPs, but each CP can observe the QoS experienced
by end users through demand for their contents. Thus, higher
the effort (caching) by the ISP, higher will be the revenue
for CP because of the price paid for their content or from
advertisements (from the click-through rate) [20]. However,
the ISP’s profit maximization strategy may not be aligned with
the interests of the CPs, and moreover, the ISP effort (that
influence CP revenue) is not directly observable by CPs. This
scenario gives rise to the Moral Hazard problem.
Let n denote the number of CPs and N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the
set of CPs. For each i ∈ N we denote i-th CP as CPi . The
revenue of CPi from its content is random and denoted as
Xi ∈ R+ with probability density function Fi . The amount of
efforts put by the ISP to improve the demand for the content
of CPi is quantified by a positive number denoted as ai ∈ R+.
3Fig. 1. Revenue flow between CPs, ISP and End Users.
CPi shares part of his revenue with the ISP to incentivize
ISP investments. This share is determined by the outcome as
sharing function si : R+ → R+, which is called contract or
agreement in the moral hazard framework. Specifically, if xi
is the realized revenue in a month for CPi , it gives si(xi)
to the ISP. Then, the net revenue of CPi is xi − si(xi). Our
goal in this work is first to design optimal sharing functions
si(·), i ∈ N that maximize the expected net revenues of each
CPs taking into account the rational behavior of the ISP and
its participation constraints. We assume that the CPs offer a
similar type of content and compete with each other to attract
more demand. Our model with multiple CPs and a single ISP
is depicted in Figure 1. In the terminology of moral hazard,
the CPs are the principles, and the ISP is the agent. We thus
have multiple principles and a single agent.
Demand and Revenue: The increment in demand for content
of CPi depends on the effort by the ISP to improve QoS
for CPi content and could be random. Let Di denote this
increment in demand. We assume that the mean of Di grows
logarithmically in ai (law of diminishing gains) and is given
by Di := log(ai+1)+i, i ∈ N , where i is the random variation
in the demand for CPi .
The revenue generated for CPi is proportional to the demand
and given by Xi = riDi , where ri is a constant that captures
how each unit of demand translates to earnings. For example,
ri could be revenue per click for CPi when Di is interpreted as
total number of clicks on CPi’s content. The expected revenue
for CPi is then E[Xi] = ri log(ri + 1).1
A. Utilities and Objective
For a given contract si(·), i ∈ N the net revenue for CPi is
Xi−si(Xi). Let Vi(·) ∈ R denote the utility function of CPi and
is typically assumed to an increasing concave function of the
CP’s net revenue. We assume the utility of CPi is linear in its
net revenue and set Vi(Xi − si(Xi)) = Xi − si(Xi). The utility of
the ISP depends on revenue-share it receives from both the CPs
and also the cost involved in the efforts it puts for the CPs. The
earning for the ISP from the CPs is
∑
i si(Xi) while it incurs
1Our model generalizes trivially to the case where Di := di log(ai+1)+i,
i.e., the average demand scales with a CP-specific multiplicative constant; this
constant can simply be absorbed into ri .
a total cost of c
∑
i ai , where c is a positive constant. The net
earnings for the ISP is then W(s1(X1) . . . , sn(Xn), a1 . . . , an) =∑
i si(Xi) − c
∑
i ai . We assume the ISP is risk-averse and set
its utility as H(W) = − exp{−zW}, where z is a risk-averse
parameter. This utility is referred to as Constant Absolute Risk
Aversion (CARA) in the literature [21]. The ISP enters into
agreement with the CPs only if its expected utility is larger
than a certain threshold denoted as H.
The CPs compete against each other and aim to maximize
their utility. The objective of CPi, i ∈ N taking into participa-
tion constraints of the ISP is given as follows:
maxa1,...,an,si (·)UCPi := EXi [Vi(Xi − si(Xi))]
subjected to EX1,...,Xn [H(s1(X1), ..., sn(Xn), a1, ..., an)] ≥ H (1)
maxa1,...,a2 EX1,...,Xn [H(s1(X1), ..., sn(Xn), a1, ..., an)]. (2)
Constraint (1) guarantees the ISP minimum expected utility H
and is called as individual rationality (IR) or the participation
constraint. The second constraint (2) is the ISP’s optimization
problem and is called an incentive compatibility constraint
(IC). It also captures the fact that the CPs cannot observe
the effort level of the ISP. Note that the Constraint in (2) may
have multiple optima hence objective of each CP is optimized
over all of these possibilities. The structure of the optimization
problem is hierarchical and can be studied considering a
Stackelberg solution concept where the principals (here each
CP) can be seen as leaders and the agent (here the ISP) as the
follower who plays after observing the action of the principals.
In our setting, there is another level of complexity as there are
multiple strategic principals. This gives rise to a static game
between CPs with shared constraints.
B. Linear Contracts
In the following we consider a specific type of contract
where CPs share a fraction of their revenue to ISP. These
contracts are of the form si(Xi) = βiXi and are referred to
as linear contracts, where βi ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N . The
ISP chooses whether to accept or reject the contract. Linear
contracts are shown to be optimal in [22] particularly when
agent has a risk averse utility which is also the case in our
setting. Henceforth we denote a linear contract between the
ISP and CPi by its parameter βi . The expected utility of CPi
is then:
UCPi = E[Xi(1 − βi)] = (1 − βi)ri log(ai + 1),
and the expected utility of the ISP is:
UISP = E
[
H
(∑
i
(si(Xi) − cai)
)]
= E
[
H
(∑
i
(βiri(log(ai + 1) + i) − cai)
)]
= − exp
{
−z
∑
i
(βiri log(ai + 1) − cai)
}
E
[
exp
{
−z
∑
i
βirii
}]
.
The ISP’s optimization problem is to find an effort level ai
for each CPi which maximizes its expected utility. Notice that
maximizing expected utility (IC constraint) is equivalent to
maximizing
∑
i(βiri log(ai + 1) − cai) over (a1, . . . , an).
4C. Neutral vs Non-Neutral regime
We distinguish two scenarios based on differentiation in the
efforts by the ISP for each CP. We say that the network is
neutral if ISP puts the same amount of efforts for both the
CPs irrespective of the revenue-share it can get from them,
i.e., ISP always sets a1 = a2... = an. We say that the network
is non-neutral if the ISP can put different amount of effort
for each CP, i.e., a1 , a2... , an is permitted. Hence in the
neutral regime the ISP treats each CP identically, whereas it
can differentiate between them in the non-neutral regime.
Under the neutral regime and linear contracts, the IC
constraint of the ISP, i.e., maxa E[H(s1(X1), ..., sn(Xn), a)],
simplifies to maxa
∑
i(βiri log(a + 1) − ca). The optimal effort
level for a given contracts (βi, i ∈ N) is given by:
a∗ = max
(∑
i βiri
nc
− 1, 0
)
. (3)
The objective function of CPi, i ∈ N in the neutral regime can
then be expressed as follows:
Neutral:
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi) log(a + 1)ri
subjected to
∑
i
z(βiri log(a + 1) − ca)
− logE
[
exp
{
−z
∑
i
βirii
}]
≥ − log(−H)
and a = max
(∑
i βiri
nc
− 1, 0
)
.
(4)
Under the non-neutral regime, the IC constraint of the ISP,
i.e., maxa1,...,an E[H(s1(X1), ..., sn(Xn), a1, ..., an)], simplifies
to maxa1,...,an
∑
i(βiri log(ai + 1) − cai). The optimial efforts
level for a given contracts (βi, i ∈ N) are:
a∗i = max
(
βiri
c
− 1, 0
)
for i ∈ N .
Simplified optimization problem for each CPi can then be
expressed as the following bi-level optimization problem:
NonNeutral:
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi) log(ai + 1)ri
subjected to
∑
i
z(βiri log(ai + 1) − cai)
− logE
[
exp
{
−z
∑
i
βirii
}]
≥ − log(−H)
and ai = max
(
βiri
c
− 1, 0
)
for i ∈ N .
(5)
Notice that the ISP has incentive to enter into contract with
the CPs only when H ≥ −1, otherwise its net earning from the
CPs is negative For any value of H ∈ (−1, 0], the IR constraint
make the strategies of the players coupled and the game can
have continuum of equilibria as it is the case with general
coupled constrained games [23]. However, with continuum of
equilibria we will be faced with equilibrium selection problem
and a systematic comparison of CP utilities under the two
regime is not possible. We thus set H = −1 under which the
IC constraint ensures that the IR constraint always holds and
hence the objective of the CPs are no more jointly constrained.
As we will see in the subsequent sections, this avoids the
continuum of equilibrium. We note that even after relaxing
the IR constraint the problem is still challenging to analyze,
but makes it possible to compare equilibrium utilities of all
players under both the regimes.
We say that a contract profile (βi, i ∈ N) is an equilibrium
if no CP has an incentive for unilateral deviation from its con-
tract. In the following we superscript the quantities computed
at equilibrium with NN and N when they are associated with
non-neutral regime and neutral regime respectively.
III. SYMMETRIC CASE
In this section we consider the symmetric case where
revenue per unit demand for all the CPs is the same, i.e.,
r1 = r2, . . . ,= rn := r . In other words, the CPs are symmetric
with regards to the ability to monetize their content. In this
setting, we analyze the equilibrium contracts arising in the
neutral as well as non-neutral regime, and the resulting surplus
of the CPs and the ISP. Our results highlight, surprisingly, that
even when the CPs are symmetric, the imposition of neutrality
actually shrinks the surplus of all parties involved. Moreover,
this ‘loss of surplus’ becomes more pronounced as the number
of CPs n grows.
A. Non-neutral regime
In the non-neutral regime, it is easy to see that when
H = −1, the interactions between each CP and the ISP are
decoupled. The optimization problem in (5) for CPi, i ∈ N,
after substituting the optimal effort simplifies to:
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi)r log
(
max
(
βir
c
, 1
))
.
Moreover, we note that it is only interesting to consider the
case r > c. Indeed, since the monetization resulting from ISP
effort ai for CP i equals r log(1+ai), the marginal monetization
is at most r . Thus, if r ≤ c, it is not worthwhile for CPs to
make any investments to grow the demand.
The following result characterizes the equilibrium contracts
between each CP and the ISP. The contracts are expressed
in terms of the LambertW function computed on its principle
branch, denoted as W(·) (see [24]).
Theorem 1: If r > c, the equilibrium contract between
CPi, i ∈ N and the ISP is given by
βNN := βNNi =
1
W
(
r
c e
) . (6)
Since W(·) in strictly increasing and W(e) = 1, it follows that
βNN ∈ (0, 1) when r/c > 1. Moreover, note that equilibrium
fraction βNN of CP revenue that is shared with the ISP is
a strictly decreasing function of the ratio r/c, as might be
expected.
Using Theorem 1, one can easily characterize the equilib-
rium effort of the ISP as well as the surplus of each agent.
5Corollary 1: Assume r > c. The equilibrium effort for each
CPi, i ∈ N put by the ISP is given by
aNN := aNNi =
rβNN
c
− 1 > 0. (7)
The equilibrium surplus of CPi, i ∈ N is given by
UNNCPi = (1 − βNN )r log(aNN + 1) =
(1 − βNN )2
βNN
r > 0. (8)
Finally, the equilibrium surplus of the ISP is given by
UNNISP = nr + nc − 2nβNNr > 0. (9)
Note that so long as r > c, the equilibrium contracts award
each CP and the ISP a positive surplus.
B. Neutral regime
We now consider the neutral regime. The CPs are still
assumed to be symmetric, only the ISP is now constrained
to make the same investment decision for all CPs, i.e.,
a1 = . . . = an := a. The surplus of CPi in this case, after
substituting the optimal ISP effort simplifies to:
(1 − βi)r log
(
max
(∑n
j=1 βjr
nc
, 1
))
.
Since the surplus of each CP in the neutral regime depends on
the actions of all CPs, we seek contract profiles (βNi , i ∈ N)
that constitute a Nash equilibrium between CPs. These equi-
libria are characterized completely in the following theorem.
As before, the only scenario of interest is r > c.
Theorem 2: Consider the neutral regime with r > c. In this
case, only symmetric Nash equilibria exist. When 1 < r/c ≤ n,
there are two Nash equilibria, 0, and (βNi , i ∈ N), where
βNi = β
N :=
1
nW
(
r
nc e
1/n) . (10)
When r/c > n, (βNi , i ∈ N) is the only Nash equilibrium,
where βNi is given by (10).
Note that when 1 < r/c ≤ n, unlike in the non-neutral
regime, making no contributions to the ISP, resulting in zero
suplus for all parties, is an equilibrium between the CPs.
The other equilibrium, given by (10), results in a positive
surplus for all parties (as is shown in the following corollary).
In the remainder of this section, we will refer to this latter
equilibrium as the non-zero equilibrium.
Corollary 2: Consider the neutral regime, with r > c. Under
the non-zero equilibrium:
• The effort for CPi, i ∈ N , put by the ISP is given by
aN := aNi (n) = max
(
βNr
c
− 1, 0
)
. (11)
• The surplus of CPi, i ∈ N is given by
UNCPi = (1 − βN )r log(aN + 1) =
(
1 − βN )2
nβN
r > 0. (12)
• The surplus of ISP is given by
UNISP = r + nc − (n + 1)βNr > 0. (13)
C. Neutral regime v/s Non-neutral regime
Having now characterized the equilibrium contracts and the
surplus of each CP and the ISP under the neutral and the
non-neutral regime, we are now in a position to compare the
two. As the following result shows, the non-neutral regime
is actually better for all parties as compared to the neutral
regime.
Theorem 3: Suppose r > c, and n ≥ 2. In the symmetric
case, at equilibrium, the following statements hold.
1) CPs share a higher fraction of their revenue with the ISP
in the non-neutral regime, i.e., βNN > βN .
2) The effort by the ISP for each CP is higher in the non-
neutral regime, i.e., aNN > aN
3) The surplus of each CP is higher in the non-neutral
regime, i.e., UNNCPi > U
N
CPi
for all i ∈ N
4) The surplus of the ISP is higher in the non-neutral
regime, i.e., UNNISP > U
N
ISP .
The above result highlights that, surprisingly, constraining the
ISP to be neutral is actually sub-optimal for all parties, even
when the CPs are symmetric. In other words, the non-neutral
regime is actually preferable to the ISP as well as the CPs.
Intuitively, the reason for this tragedy of the commons is that
the imposition of neutrality skews the payoff landscape for
each CP, such that the ‘benefit’ of any additional investment
it makes gets ‘shared’ across all CPs. This induces the CPs to
commit smaller fractions of their revenues to the ISP, which in
turn results in a lower ISP effort, and a lower demand growth
for all CPs. Indeed, as we show below, this effect gets further
magnified with an increase in the number of CPs.
D. The effect of number of CPs
In the non-neutral regime, the interactions between the
different CPs and the ISP are decoupled, implying that the
impact of scaling n is trivial. Thus, we now study the impact
of scaling n in the neutral regime, on the equilibrium ISP
effort, and the surplus of each agent. Note that when n = 1,
the neutral and the non-neutral regime coincide. Our main
result is the following.
Theorem 4: Suppose that r > c. In the neutral regime, the
non-zero equilibrium satisfies the following properties.
1) βN is a strictly decreasing function of n.
2) The effort by the ISP for each CP (aN ) is a strictly
decreasing function of n, even though the total effort
(naN ) by the ISP is a strictly increasing function of n.
3) The surplus of each CP is a strictly decreasing function
of n, and limn→∞UNCPi (n) = 0.
4) The surplus of the ISP is eventually strictly decreasing
in n, and limn→∞UNISP(n) = 0.
Theorem 4 highlights that an increase in the number of CPs
further exacerbates the sub-optimality of the neutral regime
for the CPs as well as the ISP. As before, the explanation
for this is that with increasing n, the surplus resulting from
an additional contribution by any CP gets ‘split’ further, thus
disincentivising the CPs from offering a significant fraction
of their revenues to the ISP. The variation of ISP utility as a
function of n is depicted in Figure 2 for different values of
6r/c. In all cases, the utility first increase for some n and the
decreases thereafter.
Fig. 2. ISP utility in the neutral regime as n varies for different r/c.
IV. ASYMMETRIC CASE
In this section we study the asymmetric case where mone-
tizing power of all the CPs need not be the same, i.e., ri , rj
for i , j. Our interest in this section is to understand how
disparity in the monetizing power influences preference of the
players for the neutral and non-neutral regimes. We focus on
the case with two CPs (n = 2) and without loss of generality
assume that monetizing power of CP1 is more than that of
CP2, i.e., r1 > r2. We refer to CP1 as dominant and CP2 as
non-dominant.
Recall that the objective of the CPi, i ∈ N in the non-neutral
regime can be expressed as
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi)ri log
(
max
(
βiri
c
, 1
))
,
and in the neutral regime it can be expressed as
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi)ri log
(
max
(∑
i βiri
nc
, 1
))
.
As discussed in Section III, the case ri/c ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N is
not interesting as none of the CPs would have the incentive to
contribute towards ISP effort. Thus, in this section, we restrict
ourselves to the case where ri/c > 1 for at least one i ∈ N .
The following results characterize the equilibrium contracts
for the neutral and the non-neutral regime.2
A. Equilibrium contracts
In the non-neutral regime, the interactions between each
CP and the ISP remain decoupled, and thus the equilibrium
contracts follow easily from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3: In the non-neutral regime, the equilibrium
contract (βNN1 , βNN2 ) is as follows:
βNNi =
{
0 if ric ≤ 1,
1
W( ric e) if
ri
c > 1.
Note that when ric ≤ 1, the equilibrium contract between CPi
and the ISP is not uniquely defined, since any βi ∈ [0, 1] would
result in zero surplus to CPi .
Next, we characterize equilibrium contract in the neutral
regime.
Theorem 5: Consider the neutral regime, with r1 > r2.
If r1/c ≤ 2 then (βN1 , βN2 ) = (0, 0). If r1/c > 2, then the
2The characterization of equilibrium contracts can actually be done for any
n; see Appendix E.
equilibrium contract is given by:
(βN1 , βN2 ) =

(β1, β2) if r1+r2r1−r2 > 2W
( r1+r2
4c
√
e
)
,(
1
W( r12c e), 0
)
otherwise,
(14)
where
β1 =
r1 + r2
4r1W
( r1+r2
4c
√
e
) − r2 − r12r1 , β2 = r1 + r24r2W ( r1+r24c √e) − r1 − r22r2 .
When r1/c ≤ 2, the equilibrium contract is not unique,
though the outcome is that ISP effort equals zero. When
r1/c > 2, the equilibrium contract is unique, and at least one
CP (specifically, CP1) is guaranteed to contribute a constant
fraction of her revenue to the ISP. Note that when r1/c ∈ (1, 2],
there is no CP contribution in the neutral regime, even though
there is in the non-neutral regime.
To interpret the equilibrium when r1/c > 2, let r∗1 := r∗1 (r2)
denote the value of r1 that satisfies the following relation for
a given r2
r1 + r2
r1 − r2 = 2W
( r1 + r2
4c
√
e
)
.
For r1 ≤ r∗1 the condition in (14) holds where revenue shared
by both the CPs is strictly positive, i.e., βNi > 0 for all i ∈ N .
For r1 > r∗1 the condition in (14) fails in which only the CP1’s
share is strictly positive and CP2 does not share anything, i.e.,
βN1 > 0 and β
N
2 = 0. Further, it is easy to verify that r
∗
1 is
monotonically increasing in r2 and r∗1 > r2.
B. Comparison between Neutral and Non-neutral regimes
Having characterized the equilibrium contracts in both
regimes, we compare and contrast the neutral and non-neutral
regimes in the remainder of this section. We begin by com-
paring the equilibrium contracts, followed by CP/ISP utility,
social utility, and finally ISP effort.
1) Contracts: The following proposition provides a com-
parison of the equilibrium contracts in both the regimes.
Proposition 1: Fix r2 > 0. We have
• For r1 > r2, βNN2 ≥ βN2 . Moreover, βN2 decreases in r1.
• For r1 ≥ r∗1 , βN1 > βNN1 . Moreover, βN1 decreases in r1
for r1 ≥ r∗1 .
The conclusions of Proposition 1 are summarised in the scatter
plot in Fig. 3a. Note that the non-dominant CP always con-
tributes a smaller fraction of its revenue in the neutral regime.
With the dominant CP, the contribution factor is larger in the
neutral regime when the revenue rates are highly asymmetric
(see the green region in Figure 3a, and larger in the non-neutral
regime when the revenue rates are symmetric (see the red
region in Figure 3a). A sufficient condition for the former is
r1 ≥ r∗1 (r2). The latter observation is of course consistent with
Theorem 3, which dealt with the case of perfect symmetry.
Proposition 1 also establishes monotonicity properties of the
sharing contracts of CP1 in the neutral regime in r1 for a fixed
r2. While βN2 descreasess in r1, β
N
1 eventually decreasing in r1;
see Figs. 3b and 3c. Note that βN1 can actually be increasing
with respect to r1 when the revenue rates are nearly symmetric,
in contrast with the non-neutral setting.
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Fig. 3. Fig. 3a gives scatter-plot of βs. Figs. 3b and 3c shows variation of equilibrium β1 vs r1 under neutral and non-neutral regime.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4. Fig. 4a shows scatterplot for the CP utilities at equilibrium. Figs. (4b) & (4c) compare CP1 utility in both regimes as r1 varies.
2) Utility of CPs: The following proposition characterizes
preference of the CPs for the neutral and non-neutral regime.
Proposition 2: Fix an r2. We have
• For all r1 > r2, CP1 prefers the non-neutral regime.
• For all r1 ≥ r∗1 , CP2 prefers the neutral regime.
Figure 4a shows the scatter plot utilities of the players in both
the regimes. Note that the dominant CP has higher utility in
the non-neutral regime as can be observed from the red and
magenta regions. This is because in the neutral regime, the
dominant CP is ‘forced’ to pay for capacity investments that
also benefit the non-dominant CP. Indeed, note that in the
region r1 ≥ r∗1 , the dominant CP shares a smaller fraction of
its revenue in the non-neutral regime, but still ends-up with
a higher utility. Interestingly, the non-dominant CP obtains
a higher utility in the neutral regime when the asymmetric
revenue rates are too separated (see the pink region in Fig. 4a)
A sufficient condition for this is r1 ≥ r∗1 . This is of course due
to the ‘subsidization’ it receives from the dominant CP. On
the other hand, when the revenue rates are nearly symmetric,
even the non-dominant CP prefers the non-neutral regime,
once again consistent with Theorem 3. The above observations
further illustrated in Figs. 4b and 4c.
3) ISP utility: We next compare utility of the ISP in the
non-neutral and neutral regime. For simplicity, we take ISP
utility to be the expected revenue given as UISP = E[∑i s(Xi)−
cai] (ignoring the risk-sensitive utility defined before). Its
value in the non-neutral regime is given by:
UNNISP = (1 − 2βNN1 )r1 + (1 − 2βNN2 )r2 + 2c,
and in the neutral regime for all r1 ≥ r∗1 is given by:
UNISP = (1 − 2βN1 )r1 + 2c.
The utility for r1 < r∗1 in the neutral regime is cumbersome
and we skip its expression. The following lemma demonstrates
the ISPs earnings are higher in the non-neutral regime when
monetization power of the dominant CP is much larger than
the other, i.e., r1 is much larger than r2.
Lemma 1: There exist rb1 > r
∗
1 , such that for all r1 > r
b
1 the
ISP’s utility is higher in the non-neutral regime.
A general comparison of ISP utility in the two regimes is
not analytically tractable. We give a numerical illustration in
Figure 5. As seen in the first figure, utility of ISP in the non-
neutral regime is higher than in the neutral regime for all r1
for a given r2 and c. Scatter plot in the second figure shows
that this observation extends over the entire parameter range.
Fig. 5. The first figure compares ISP utility in neutral and non-neutral with
c = 1r2 = 2. The second figure gives a scatter plot.
4) Social Utility: The social utility in the non-neutral and
neutral regimes are given, respectively, as follows:
SUNN = UNNCP1 +U
NN
CP1
+UNNISP
=r1 log
(
βNN1 r1
c
)
+ r2 log
(
βNN2 r2
c
)
− (βNN1 r1 + βNN2 r2) + 2c
8and
SUN = UNCP1 +U
N
CP1
+UNISP
= (r1 + r2) log
(
βN1 r1 + β
N
2 r2
c
)
− (βN1 r1 + βN2 r2) + 2c.
As it is not easy to compare the social utilities analytically,
Fig. 6. Comparison of social utility between neutral and non-neutral regime
for c = 1, r2 = 2 and scatter plot.
we resort to numerical comparison of the utilities in Figure
6. As seen social utility in the non-neutral regime dominates
that in the neutral regime for all values of r1 for a given r2
and c. The scatter plot in the second part of the figure shows
that the observation continue to hold for all parameters.
5) Total Effort by ISP: Finally we compare the total effort
by ISP for CPs in the non-neutral and neutral regime given,
respectively, as follows
ANN = aNN1 + a
NN
2 =
βNN1 r1
c
− 1 + β
NN
2 r2
c
− 1
=
r1
c
W( r1c e)
+
r2
c
W( r2c e)
− 2 ∀ r1 > r∗1,
and
AN = 2aN = 2
(
βN1 r1
2c
− 1
)
=
r1
c
W( r12c e)
− 2 ∀ r1 > r∗1
Lemma 2: There exist a threshold ra1 > r
∗
1 such that total
effort by ISP is higher in neutral regime than in the non-
neutral. The threshold satisfies the following:
The threshold ra1 is given by following equation:
ra1
©­« 1W( ra12c e) − 1W( ra1c e)ª®¬ = r2W( r2c e)
It can be seen from above equation that ra1 is monotonically
increasing in r2.
The above lemma implies that total effort by ISP in the
neutral regime becomes higher when there is high asymmetry
between CP’s revenue per click rates.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND REGULATORY ISSUES
We studied the problem of revenue sharing between multiple
CPs and an ISP on the Internet using the moral hazard frame-
work with multiple principles and a single agent. We compared
the revenues of each player and the social utility in a regime
Fig. 7. Scatter plot for comparison between total effort (investment) by ISP
in non-neutral and neutral regime over different range of ri/c
where the ISP is forced to put equal effort for all the CPs
(neutral) with a regime where there are no such restrictions
(non-neutral) on the ISP. Our key take-away is that every one
is better off and social utility is higher in non-neutral regime
when the CPs ability to montize their demand are ‘nearly’ the
same. When the there is a large disparity in the monetization
power of the CPs, for the case of two CPs we showed that
non-neutral regime is preferable from the standpoint of the
dominant CP (with higher monetizing power), the ISP, and
from the standpoint of social utility. On the other hand, the
non-dominant CP is benefited by a neutrality stipulation since
it gets to ‘free-ride’ on the contribution made by the dominant
CP, the very reason that makes this regime less preferred by
the dominat CP.
Our analysis throws up an intriguing dilemma for a regulator
–enforcing neutrality brings in parity in the way ISP treat the
CPs, but it worsens the social utility and pay-off of all the
players compared to the neutral regime if the players act non-
cooperatively. It is then interesting to study mechanisms that
the regulator can use to induce cooperation among the the
players so that the social utility and players pay-off are no
worse than in the non-neutral regime.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
From CPi optimization problem, it can be observed that for
r/c < 1 UCPi = 0 for all i. Henc e no CP has an incentive
to share a fraction of their revenue with the ISP and βi =
0 ∀i ∈ N is the equilibirum. Now assume r/c ≥ 1. For this
case the optimial value of βi will be such that rβi/c ≥ 1 and
the optimization problem of CPi reduces to
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi)r log
(
βir
c
)
.
The first order optimality condition ∂UCPi /∂βi = 0 then gives:
log
(
βir
c
)
=
1 − βi
βi
∀i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Solving the first order conditions for each CPi , we get:
1 − βi
βi
= log
(
βir
c
)
=⇒ 1
βi
= log
(
βire
c
)
=⇒ e 1βi = βire
c
=⇒ 1
βi
e
1
βi =
re
c
9Using the definition of the LamebertW funtion we get
1
βi
= W
( r
c
e
)
=⇒ βi = 1
W
(
r
c e
)
Hence we get equilibrium contract given in (6).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Recall the objective of CPi, i ∈ N
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi)r log
(
max
(∑n
j=1 βjr
nc
, 1
))
.
First assume that r/c < 1. In this case for any given
(β1, β2, . . . , βi−1, βi+1, . . . , βn), best response of CPi is to set
βi = 0. Thus βi = 0 ∀i ∈ N is an equilibrium.
Next consider the case 1 ≤ r/c < n. Fix an i ∈ N and assume
βj = 0 for all j , i. Then the object of CPi simplifies to
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi)r log
(
max
(
βir
nc
, 1
))
,
and the best response of CPi is to set βi = 0. Hence βi = 0
for all i ∈ N is an equilibrium. We next look for a non-zero
equilibrium. By symmetry, it must be such that β1 = β2 . . . =
βn ∈ (0, 1]. Further, at equilibrium it must be the case that∑n
i=1 βjr/nc ≥ 1, otherwise CPs have incentive to deviate to
make their share zero. Writing the first order condition for the
optimaization problem of CPi, i ∈ N , i.e.,
max
βi ∈[0,1]
(1 − βi)r log
(∑
j βjr
nc
)
,
we get
log
(∑n
j=1 βjr
nc
)
=
1 − βi∑n
j=1 βj
.
Setting β1 = β2, . . . ,= βn = β we have
log
(
βr
c
)
=
1 − β
nβ
.
Simplyfying the above as earlier in the format of LambertW
function we get β = 1
nW ( rnc e1/n)
.
For the case r/c ≥ n, βi = 0, ∀i ∈ N at equilibrium is not
arise, however the equilibrium β = 1
nW ( rnc e1/n)
still holds. This
completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Part 1: When r/c ≤ 1, βNN = βN = 0 and the relation βNN ≥
βN holds trivially. In the range 1 < r/c ≤ n, two equilibria
are possible in the neutral regime, βN = 0 or 1
nW (r/ce1/n) . If
βN = 0 is the equilibrium, again the relation holds trivially.
Consider the case when βN = 1
nW (r/ce1/n) is the equilibrium
for 1 < r/c. Define b := r/c and f (b) = βNN
βN
.
lim
b→1
f (b) = lim
b→1
nW( bn e
1
n )
W(e)
=
nW( 1n e
1
n )
W(e) =
n. 1n
1
= 1 (using x = W(xex))
Fig. 8. Utility of CP vs β
The limit holds as the equlibrium definition holds for all b > 1
and W is continuous at b = 1. Also, f (b) is monotonically
increasing in b forall b > 1 as
∂ f (b)
∂b
=
nW(be 1n /n)
bW(be)
[
W(be) −W(be 1n /n)
(1 +W(be))(1 +W(be 1n /n))
]
> 0∀b > 1
Hence βNN > βN . It holds similarly for the case r/c > n.
Part 2: Since investment decision by ISP is monotonically
increasing in the share in gets fromt the CPs (from Eqns. (7)
and (11), by Part 1 it is clear that ISP make more investment
in non-neutral regime as compared to neutral regime.
Part 3: In both non-neutral and neutral regime equilibrium
effort, a for given β is a + 1 = max
(
βr
c , 0
)
.
Now, in both non-neutral and neutral regimes, each CP’s
utility at equilibrium is the same function given by (1 −
β)r log
(
max
(
βr
c , 0
))
which is concave in β ∈ (c/r, 1) and
from Part 1 we have that βN ≤ βNN . This implies that
UN
CP
≤ UNN
CP
(seen Fig. 8)
Part 4:
UNNISP = [nβNNr log(aNN + 1) − nc(aNN )]
Substituting the value of aNN (βNN ) = βNN rc −1 in the second
term of above expression, we get:
UNNISP = {nβNNr
[
log(aNN + 1) − 1] + nc} (15)
Similarly,
UNISP = [nβNr
[
log(aN + 1) − 1] + nc] (16)
Now, from Part 1 and 2, we know that βNN ≥ βN and aNN ≥
aN , respectively. Thus, by comparing Eqns. (15) and (16), we
have that UNN
ISP
≥ UN
ISP
.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Part 1: Considering n to be continuous variable,
∂βN (n)
∂n
=
1
n2W
(
r
nc e
1/n) [−1 + 1 + 1n1 +W ( rnc e1/n)
]
Now, βN (n) decreases with n iff ∂βN∂n < 0
⇐⇒
[
−1 + 1 +
1
n
1 +W
(
r
nc e
1/n) ] < 0 ⇐⇒ [ 1 + 1n1 +W ( rnc e1/n)
]
< 1
⇐⇒ 1 + 1
n
< 1 +W
( r
nc
e1/n
)
⇐⇒ 1 < nW
( r
nc
e1/n
)
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it holds as βN (n) = 1
nW( rnc e1/n) < 1 =⇒ nW
(
r
nc e
1/n
)
> 1.
Part 2: Effort of ISP for each CP is decreasing following
directly as βN is decreasing in n. The total effort of ISP is
AN (n) = naN (n) = n
(
βN r
c − 1
)
. In the following we show
that AN (n + 1) > AN (n) for any n. We have
AN (n+1) > AN (n) ⇐⇒ (n+1)βN (n+1)−nβN (n) > c
r
(17)
We prove that the above inequality holds in two part.
Part (i): We first prove that g(n) = nβN (n) is concave in n,
which implies the difference (n+1)βN (n+1)−nβN (n) shrinks
as n increases. Now,
g(n) = nβN (n) = 1
W
(
b
n e
1
n
) ; where b = r
c
It is clear that g(n) is increasing in n. Treating n as continuous
variable, we have
∂ f (n)
∂n
=
n + 1
n2W
(
b
n e
1
n
) (
1 +W
(
b
n e
1
n
)) > 0
∂2 f (n)
∂n2
=
1
n4W
(
b
n e
1
n
) (
1 +W
(
b
n e
1
n
))2×
(n + 1)2
(
1 + 2W
(
b
n e
1
n
))(
1 +W
(
b
n e
1
n
)) − n(n + 2) (1 +W ( b
n
e
1
n
))
Now, f (n) is strictly concave in n iff ∂2 f (n)
∂n2
< 0
⇐⇒ (n + 1)
2
n(n + 2) <
(
1 +W
(
b
n e
1
n
))2(
1 + 2W
(
b
n e
1
n
))
After cross multiplying and expanding, we get
1 + 2W
(
b
n e
1
n
)
nW
(
b
n e
1
n
)
+ 2W
(
b
n e
1
n
) < nW ( b
n
e
1
n
)
We know that 1/βN = nW
(
a
n e
1
n
)
> 1 at equilibrium,therefore
LHS<1 and RHS>1. Thus, the above inequality holds .
Part (ii): Now, we show that (n + 1)βN (n + 1) − nβN (n) →
c/r as n→∞. Consider asymptotic expansion of LambertW
function, W(x) = x − x2 + o(x2) = x(1 − x + o(x))
1
W(x) =
1
x(1 − x + o(x)) =
1
x
· (1 + x + o(x)) = 1
x
+ 1 + o(1)
second equality comes by using 11−x = 1 + x + o(x).Now,
f (n) = nβN (n) = 1
W
(
r
nc e
1
n
) = nc
re
1
n
+ 1 + o(1)
=
nc
r
(
1 − 1
n
+ o
(
1
n
))
+ 1 + o(1) = nc
r
− c
r
+ 1 + o(1)
(18)
third equality comes by using e−x = 1 − x + o(x).Therefore,
f (n + 1) − f (n) = (n + 1)c
r
− nc
r
→ c
r
as n→∞
Part 3: For any n each CP’s utility for the given a at
equilibrium, is given by (1 − β)r log
(
max
(
βr
c , 0
))
.
We know that the above function is concave in
β ∈ (c/r, 1] and from Part 1, as n increases
βN (n) decreases and approaches c/r when n → ∞©­« 1nW ( rnc e 1n ) = 1n( rnce1/n −( rnce1/n )2−o( 1n2 )) → cr , asn→∞ª®¬.
This implies that UN
CP
(n) decreases as n increases (see Fig.
8). Also it can be seen that as n→∞,UN
CP
→ 0.
Part 4:
UNISP = n(βNr log(aN + 1) − caN )
= n
(
βNr log
(
βNr
c
)
− c
(
βNr
c
− 1
))
= r + nc − (n + 1)βNr
Utility of ISP from each CP is
UN
ISP
n
= βNr log(aN + 1) − caN (19)
Substituting the value of aN = β
N r
c − 1 in the second term,
we get
UN
ISP
n = β
Nr
(
log(aN + 1) − 1) + c. Since βN ans aN
decreases with increase in n, it is clear from above expression
that utility of ISP from each CP also decreases with increase
in number of CPs.
Now, UISP(n)N increases with increase in n iff
UISP(n)N
∂n
> 0 (considering n to be continuous)
c − 1
n2W
(
r
nc e
1
n
) ©­­«
n2 + n + 1 − nW
(
r
nc e
1
n
)
n
(
1 +W
(
r
nc e
1
n
)) ª®®¬ r > 0
1
n2W
(
r
nc e
1
n
) ©­­«
n2 + n + 1 − nW
(
r
nc e
1
n
)
n
(
1 +W
(
r
nc e
1
n
)) ª®®¬ <
c
r
Since, c/r > 0, we have
1
n2W
(
r
nc e
1
n
) ©­­«
n2 + n + 1 − nW
(
r
nc e
1
n
)
n
(
1 +W
(
r
nc e
1
n
)) ª®®¬ < 0
⇐⇒ n2 + n + 1 − nW
( r
nc
e
1
n
)
< 0.
E. Asymmetric case: Equilibrium Contracts for n > 2
Theorem 6: In the non-neutral regime equilibrium contract
for CPi is given by
βNNi =
{
0 if ric < 1,
1
W( ric e) if
ri
c ≥ 1,
(20)
Further, the effort levels of the ISP for are given by
aNNi = max
(
βNNi ri
c
− 1, 0
)
∀i = 1, 2, · · · n. (21)
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Theorem 7: In the neutral regime, each CPi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n
shares a positive fraction of the revenue at equilibrium with the
ISP only if ri/c > 1∀i = 1, 2, · · · , n and r1, r2, ..., rn are close
enough to each other. Specifically, the equilibrium contract is
as follows
βNi =
∑n
j=1 rj
n2riW
(∑n
j=1 rj
n2c
e
1
n
) −∑nj=1, j,i rj − (n − 1)ri
nri
;∀i = 1, 2, ..., n.
(22)
and the equilibrium effort is aN =
(∑n
j=1 β jrj
nc − 1
)
.
When r1 >> r2, only CP1 shares positive fraction at equilib-
rium, and the equilibrium contract is given as follows:
βN1 =
1
W
( r1
nc e
) ,&β∗i = 0, ∀i = 2, 3, ..., n (23)
and the equilibrium effort is aN =
(
β1r1
nc − 1
)
Proof: Substituting the best action of ISP determined in
CPi’s optimization problem, we get:
max
βi
(1 − βi)ri log
(
max
(∑n
j=1 βjrj
nc
, 1
))
First order necessary condition for CPi gives
(1 − βi)ri∑n
j=1 βjrj
− log
(∑n
j=1 βjrj
nc
)
= 0 ∀ i = 1, 2, ..., n (24)
Comparing these set of eqns, we get,
(1 − β1)r1 = (1 − β2)r2 = ... = (1 − βn)rn
=⇒ βiri = βjrj + ri − rj ; ∀ i = 1, 2, ..., n; i , j
∴
n∑
j=1
βjrj = nβiri +
n∑
j=1, j,i
rj − (n − 1)ri∀ i = 1, 2, ..., n
Substituting, we get
(1 − βi)ri
nβiri +
∑n
j=1, j,i rj − (n − 1)ri
= log
(
nβiri +
∑n
j=1, j,i rj − (n − 1)ri
nc
)
(25)
Adding 1/n to both the sides of eqn.(25), we get∑n
j=1 rj
n
(
nβiri +
∑n
j=1, j,i rj − (n − 1)ri
)
= log
(
nβiri +
∑n
j=1, j,i rj − (n − 1)ri
nc
)
+ log e
1
n
Rearranging and solving, we get
βi =
∑n
j=1 rj
n2riW
(∑n
j=1 rj
n2c
e
1
n
) − ∑nj=1, j,i rj − (n − 1)ri
nri
; i = 1, 2, ..., n
Since, r1 > r2, β1 > 0, however, β2, β3, ..., βn in above expres-
sion can tale negative value. therefore, the above solution holds
only if ri’s are sufficiently close s.t. above solution is positive
∀i = 1, 2, ..., n. Else, β2, β3, ..., βn = 0, and β1 is obtained from
(1−β1)
β1
− log
(
β1r1
nc
)
= 0. Solution of which is β1 = 1W( r1nc e) .
F. Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: We know that there exist some r1 < r∗1 , for which
βNN2 is positive given by
βN2 =
r1 + r2
4r2W
( r1+r2
4c e
0.5) − r1 − r22r2
Now, differentiating βN2 w.r.t r2, we get:
∂βN2
∂r2
=
1
4
(
1 +W
(
r2
r1+r2
4c e
0.5) ) − 12 ≤ 0 ∀ r1 ≥ r2
which implies decreasesβN2 with increase in r1.
And for r1 > r∗1 , β
N
2 = 0. And β
NN
2 =
1
W ( r2c e0.5)
> 0
which remain unchanged with increase in r1. Also at r1 = r2
(symmetric case), βNN2 ≥ βN2 . Thus, βNN2 ≥ βN2 ∀ r1 ≥ r2.
Part 2: It is clear from the expression of βNN1 that it is
decreasing in r1 Now, there exist some r1 > r∗1 for which
βN1 is β
N
1 =
1
W ( r12c e)
,which also decreases with increase in r1.
Also, for r1 > r∗1 , β
N
1 > β
NN
1 . Now, consider the case when
r1 ≤ r∗1 where
βN1 =
r1 + r2
4r1W
( r1+r2
4c e
0.5) − r2 − r12r1
Now, differentiating βN1 w.r.t r1, we get:
∂βN1
∂r1
=
(
1 +W
( r1+r2
4c e
0.5) ) (2W ( r1+r24c e0.5) − 1) − r1
4r21W
(
1 +W
( r1+r2
4c e
0.5) )
And it can take both negative and positive values depending
upon value of r2. Therefore, it if not apparent that whether βN1
increases or decreases when r1 < r∗1 .
G. Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1: Utility of CP1 in non-neutral regime is given by
UNNCP1 = (1 − βNN1 )r1 log
(
βNN1 r1
c
)
=
(1 − βNN1 )2
βNN1
r1
(Using first order condition
(1−βNN1 )
βNN1
= log
(
βNN1 r1
c
)
)
Utility of CP1 in neutral regime is given by for all r1 > r∗1
UNCP1 = (1 − βN1 )r1 log
(
βN1 r1
2c
)
=
(1 − βN1 )2
βN1
r1
(Using first order condition
(1−βN1 )
βN1
= log
(
βN1 r1
2c
)
)
We know for all r1 > r∗1 , β
N
1 > β
NN
1 .
=⇒ (1 − βN1 )2 < (1 − βNN1 )2and
1
βN1
<
1
βNN1
=⇒ (1 − β
N
1 )2
βN1
r1 <
(1 − βNN1 )2
βNN1
r1,thus, UNCP1 < U
NN
CP1
Part 2: Utility of CP2 in non-neutral regime is given by
UNNCP2 = (1 − βNN2 )r2 log
(
βNN2 r2
c
)
=
(1 − βNN2 )2
βNN2
r2
12
(Using first order condition
(1−βN2 )
βN2
= log
(
βN2 r1
c
)
)
Utility of CP2 in non-neutral regime is given by for r1 ≥ r∗1
UNCP2 = (1 − βN2 )r2 log
(
βN1 r1 + β
N
2 r2
2c
)
=
(1 − βN1 )
βN1
r2
(Using first order condition
(1−βN1 )
βN1
= log
(
βN1 r1
2c
)
)
Now, UNNCP2 ≤ UNCP2 iff
(1 − βNN2 )2
βNN2
≤ (1 − β
N
1 )
βN1
We know that when r1 > r∗1 , β
N
1 decreases with increase in r1.
Thus, RHS of above inequality is increasing in r1. However,
βNN2 remain unchanged with increase in r1, implying that LHS
of the above inequality is constant. Therefore, there exist some
r1, beyond which the above inequality holds. We know that
UNN
CP2
remain constant with increase in r1.
H. Proof of lemma 1
Utility of ISP in non-neutral regime is given by
UNNISP = β
NN
1 r1 log
(
βNN1 r1
c
)
+ βNN2 r2 log
(
βNN2 r2
c
)
− c
(
βNN1 r1
c
+
βNN2 r2
c
− 2
)
= (1 − 2βNN1 )r1 + (1 − 2βNN2 )r2 + 2c
(Using first order condition
(1−βNi )
βNi
= log
(
βNi ri
c
)
; i = 1, 2)
Utility of ISP in neutral regime is given by for r1 ≥ r∗1
UNISP = β
N
1 r1 log
(
βN1 r1
2c
)
− 2c
(
βN1 r1
2c
− 1
)
= (1 − 2βN1 )r1 + 2c
(Using first order condition
(1−βN1 )
βN1
= log
(
βN1 r1
2c
)
)
Now, UNN
ISP
≥ UN
ISP
iff
(1 − 2βNN1 )r1 + (1 − 2βNN2 )r2 ≥ (1 − 2βN1 )r1
2(βN1 − βNN1 )r1 ≥ −(1 − 2βNN2 )r2
2r1
(
1
W( r12c e)
− 1
W( r1c e)
)
≥
(
2
1
W( r2c e)
− 1
)
r2
LHS in increasing in r1, however RHS remain unchanged.
Therefore, there must exist some r1 > r∗1 say r
b
1 s.t. for all
r1 > rb1 the above inequality holds. Also, plot shows that ISP
is always better off in non-neutral regime.
I. Proof of Lemma 2
AN ≥ ANN ⇐⇒
r1
c
W( r12c e)
− 2 ≥
r1
c
W( r1c e)
+
r2
c
W( r2c e)
− 2
⇐⇒ r1
(
1
W( r12c e)
− 1
W( r1c e)
)
≥ r2
W( r2c e)
LHS of above inequality is increasing in r1 and RHS remains
unchanged. With increase in r1 for fixed r2, the above inequal-
ity will start holding for some large value of r1. Thus, the
above inequality will hold for some large enough ra1 >> r
∗
1 .
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